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REGIONAL COHESION:
Evidence and Theories of Regional Growth and Convergence

Abstract

After arguing that the concepts of P-convergence and u-convergence are
independently interesting, this paper extends the empirical evidence on
regional growth and convergence across the United States, Japan, and five
European nations. Ve confirm that the estimated speeds of convergence are
surprisingly similar across data sets: regions tend to converge at a speed
of approximately two percent per year. Ve also show that the interregional
distribution of income in all countries has shrunk over time. Ve then argue
that, among the proposed potential explanations of this phenomenon, the
one-sector neoclassical growth model and the hypothesis of technological
diffusion seem to be the only one which survive scrutiny.
Key Vords: Regional Economic Growth, Regional Cohesion, Convergence,
Neoclassical Growth, Endogenous Growth, Capital Mobility, Technological
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During the last ten years, there has been a revival of interest in the
forces that lead to econom~c convergence. This revival has been partly
spurred by the renewed interest in the general topic of economic growth.

A

significant contribution to this revival has been the use of the convergence
hypothesis as the main test to differentiate the two main current approaches
to economic growth: the neoclassical model and the models of endogenous
growth.

Romer (1986] and Rebelo [1991] argued that the absence of

convergence across economies throughout the world represented strong evidence
against the neoclassical model and in favor of their theories of endogenous
growth.
But there are reasons other than the testing of economic growth theories
for the empirical study of economic convergence.

Ve, as economists, are

interested in knowing whether the distribution of income changes over time.
For example, we are interested in whether, within a country, interregional
differences in income levels tend to disappear or tend to increase over time.
If they diminish, then we may be less worried about creating aid programs
(such as the Regional and Cohesion Fund Policies carried out by the
Government of the European Community) than if these differences tend to
perpetuate themselves. Ve are also interested in knowing whether the regions
that are relatively poor now are the same as the ones that were relatively
poor one hundred years ago.

If the answer is yes (that is, if poverty tends

to persist over time), then we may want to enact public aid programs to allow
the poor regions to escape this predicament.

If the answer is no (that is,

the economies that are relatively poor today are not likely to remain
relatively poor in the future), then we may be no need to worry about the
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country-wide distribution of income. As we will see in the next few
sections, these questions are related to the empirical phenomenon which we
call convergence.
In this paper, we will analyze and expand some of the results found in
the recent empirical literature of regional convergence. Ve will argue that,
in a variety of data sets, there is evidence of strong forces leading to
regional convergence. Moreover, the estimated speeds of convergence are so
surprisingly similar across data sets, that we can use a mnemonic rule:
economies converge at a speed of about two percent per year.

analyze different ways to account for these results.

Ve will then

The paper will conclude

with a short review of the hypotheses which have been proposed to explain the
convergence phenomenon.

Explanations such as measurement error, government

cohesion policies, migration, and perfect capital mobility will be ruled out.
The neoclassical growth model (amended with partial capital mobility) and
technological diffusion will be left as the likely explanations of the
convergence phenomenon.

(1)

Concepts of Convergence

P-convergence versus u-convergence

The first thing we shall do is define what is meant by convergence.

In

attempting to do this, we note that the literature has used many definitions
(see for example Quah [1993a]). Ve will use two concepts:

u-convergence and

P-convergence.
Ve will say that there is P-convergence in a cross-section of economies
if we find a negative relation between the growth rate of income per capita

3

and the initial level of income. 1 In other words, we say that there is
P-convergence if poor economies tend to grow faster than wealthy ones.

This

concept of convergence is often confused with an alternative definition of
convergence, where that the dispersion of real per capita income across
groups of economies tends to fall over time.

This is what we call

u- convergence.

Ve will argue later that, although they are not identical, the two
concepts of convergence are related.

Some people have argued that the

concept of P-convergence is irrelevant and the only thing of interest is
whether the world distribution of income becomes more equitable over time.
Quah (1993a] makes this point forcefully in the context of Galton's fallacy
(see also Friedman (1992].)
Ve disagree with the Quah-Friedman assessment, because we believe that
both concepts of convergence are interesting and should be analyzed
empirically.

Let us illustrate why /3-convergence is interesting

independently of u-convergence, with two examples where u-convergence is
eliminated by construction.
over time.

Consider the ordinal rankings of the NBA teams

The dispersion of rankings is constant by definition.

Sports

analysts and NBA owners are interested in questions such as "how quickly the
great teams revert to mediocrity", "how long do dynasties last in
basketball".

For example, how long did it take for the great Boston Celtics

of the 1950s and 1960s and the Los Angeles Lakers of the 1980s to become
average teams?.

How long will it take for the Chicago Bulls to go back to

mediocrity now that the great Michael Jordan has retired.
The reverse is also interesting: How quickly do mediocre teams become
1 This

phenomenon is sometimes called 'regression to the mean'.
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great teams?

For example, how long did it take to create the Celtics of the

1950s, the Lakers of the 1980s, or the Bulls of the 1990s? One could even be
interested in the type of policies the NBA could introduce to transform bad
teams into great teams in as little time as possible.

For instance, we could

ask whether the introduction of the draft accelerated the convergence
process.
At the other end of the spectrum, we observe sports leagues like the
Spanish soccer league where two teams, Barcelona and Real Madrid, win the
overwhelming majority of the titles. Ve could ask what the mechanisms are
that allow for this outcome (for instance, in Spain there is no draft and
there are no salary caps;

this enables the rich teams to buy the best

players and, as a result they win more titles and become even richer).

Once

we identify these mechanisms, we can think about ways to increase the
competitiveness of the other teams, and as a result, increase the aggregate
interest in the league.

Ve believe that all these questions are interesting.

But note, that all of them refer to the concept of P-convergence, not
u-convergence.

In fact, reducing the cross sectional variance in a sports

league would probably not make any sense (consider how interesting a league
would be if all teams tied for first place every single year!)
Similar examples can be constructed using economics.

Consider, for

example, two economies with identical degrees of income inequality.

Suppose

that, over a period of 50 years, these indexes of inequality remain constant
(so neither economy exhibits u-convergence across individuals.)
structures of the two countries, however, are very different.
mainly agricultural.

The economic
Country A is

The scarce land is controlled by the small privileged

class who bequeaths it to their children.

Hence, the children of the rich
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end up being rich and the children of the poor end up being poor.
is centered around the industrial sector.

Economy B

A few skillful entrepreneurs, who

had good ideas and vere able to implement them, are the rich owners of the
companies. The rest of the population works for them.

Some of the workers'

children have good ideas and entrepreneurial skills so that they start their
own companies and become rich.

Some of the children of the original owners

are not as bright as their parents, so eventually they lose their parents'
fortunes.· After 50 years, the degree of income inequality remains constant
but the wealth is held by different families.

Economy B displays

P-convergence in the sense that the growth rate of income was higher for the
poor families than the rich ones.

Economy A, on the other hand, does not

display P-convergence because the growth rate of income for the rich was the
same as that of the poor (so that their income differentials persisted over
50 years).

Is our economy more like A or like B? If it is like B, how fast

do the poor become rich and the rich poor? Can anything be done to transform
economies like A into economies like B? All these interesting questions deal
exclusively to the concept of P-convergence (note that u-convergence has been
eliminated by construction, and we can still find interesting economic
questions to discuss).
These examples are NOT meant to suggest that u-convergence is
uninteresting.

On the contrary, it is very important to know whether actual

economies's incomes are becoming more similar or whether the differences
between rich and poor families or individuals shrink over time.

The examples

illustrate that the two concepts examine interesting phenomena which are
conceptually different:

u-convergence studies how the distribution of income

evolves over time and P-convergence studies the mobility of income within the

. r
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same distribution.

Ve believe, therefore, that both concepts should be

studied and applied empirically and we will do so in this paper.

The lelation Between P-Convergence and u-Convergence
Although different, the two concepts of convergence are related.
that P-convergence holds for a group of regions i, where i=l, ... ,N.

Suppose
In

discrete time, corresponding perhaps to annual data, the real per capita
income for economy i can be approximated by
(1)

where a and Pare constants, with O<P<l, and uit is a disturbance term.

The

condition P>O implies P-convergence because the annual growth rate
log(yit/Yi t-l) is inversely related to the log(yi t- 1). A higher
'
'
coefficient P corresponds to a greater tendency for convergence. 2 The
disturbance term captures temporary shocks to the production function, the
saving rate, and so on. Ve assume that uit has mean zero, the same variance,

u!, for all economies, and is independent over time and across economies.
In order to measure the cross-sectional dispersion of income, we take the
sample variance of the log of income
N

(2)

(1/n)

l

[log(yit)-µt]2,

i=1
where µtis the sample mean of log(yit).

If N is large, then the sample

variance is close to the population variance, and we can use (1) to derive
the evolution of

u! over time:

(3)

2The condition P<1 rules out leapfrogging or overshooting, where poor
economies are systematically predicted to get ahead of rich economies at
future dates.
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This is a first-order difference equation, which is stable if O<P<l.

If

there is no P-convergence so that P<O, then the cross-sectional variance
increases over time. That is, if there is no P-convergence, there cannot be
u-convergence (in other words, P-convergence is a necessary condition for
u-convergence).

u!

The steady-state value of
is given by
2
(u )* = cr!/(1- (1-P) 2].

The steady-state dispersion falls with P but rises with the variance
the disturbance term.

u! of

Note that the steady-state dispersion is positive even

if Pis positive as long as u!>O. Ve can solve the difference equation (3)
to find an expression for
(4)

2

u! over time:
2

ut = (u )*

2

2

2

(1-P) • (ut-l - (u )*].

+

If P-convergence holds (P>O), then

u! approaches its steady-state value

(u2)*

monotonically.

The key point, however, is that u~ can increase or decrease
towards the steady-state depending on whether the initial value of u2 is
above or below the steady-state.
along the transition even if P>O.

Note in particular that

u

could be rising

In other words, P-convergence is not a

sufficient condition for u-convergence.

Summarizing, P-convergence is a

necessary but not a sufficient condition for u-convergence.
In Section (3) we will analyze empirical evidence on P-convergence and
u-convergence separately.

In a series of recent papers, Danny Quah has

proposed new ways of jointly analyzing

u

and p using Stochastic Kernels for

the dynamics of the distribution of output or income per capita (see for
example Quah [1993b]).
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Conditional P- Con1Jergence

Following Barro and Sala-i-lartin [1991, 1992a] and lankiw, Romer and
Veil [1992], ve can also distinguish conditional from absolute convergence.

Ve say that a set of economies displays conditional P-convergence if the
partial correlation between growth and initial income is negative.

In other

words, if we run a cross-sectional regression of growth on initial income,
holding constant a number of additional variables, and we find that the
coefficient on initial income is negative, then we say that the economies in
the data set display conditional P-convergence.

If the coefficient of

initial income is negative in a univariate regression, then we say that the
data set displays absolute convergence.
In the regional data sets studied in this paper, we ignore the
conditioning issue.

There are two reasons for this.

First, unlike the

regressions involving cross-sections of countries, we find convergence in
regional data sets, without the inclusion of conditioning variables.

Second,

and perhaps more importantly, a variety of studies have found that the
estimates of p for regional data sets do not change substantially when the
sets of variables that are usually held constant in cross-country studies are
included in the analysis (see for example Barro [1991] .)

{2)

Regional Data Sets

In a number of papers, Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1995]
have analyzed the convergence properties of the regions within various
countries.

The results, extended to 1990, are reported in Table 1 and

Figures 1 to 6. Table 1 provides evidence for P-convergence for the regions
of the United States {48 contiguous states), Canada {10 provinces), Japan {47
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prefectures), and Europe (73 nuts 2 regions). The dates for which data are
available for the various countries differ somewhat. For the United States,
we have annual personal income data computed by the U.S. Commerce Department
beginning in 1929 (see Bureau of Economic Analysis [1986]).

The concept of

personal income used in these regional accounts corresponds to the concept
used in the national accounts. Thus, if we add personal income for each of
the states, we would get (at least theoretically) the U.S. aggregate figure
for personal income 3 • Ve use the figures that exclude transfer payments. Ve
expanded the data set with Easterlin's [1960a, 1960b] estimates of state
personal income for 1880 (47 states and territories), 1900 (48 states and
territories), and 1920 {48 states).

These data also exclude transfer

payments.
Ve do not have measures of price levels or price indexes for individual
states.

Therefore, we deflate the nominal values for each state by the

national consumer price index.

Given that we use the same price deflator for

all states in a single year,. the particular deflator that we use affects only
the constant term in the empirical analysis.

Population data are taken from

the U.S. Bureau of the Census [1975] and Department of Commerce [1990].
The data on income across Japanese prefectures were collected by the
Economic Planning Agency (EPA) of Japan and start in 1955. The prefectural
income accounts are reported by the respective prefectures on the basis of
the "1983 Standardized System of Prefectural Accounts" so the income for all
prefectures is standardized. The data are collected annually (so there is no
interpolation) by the EPA and published in the "Annual Report on Prefectural

3 Note, however, that we exclude Alaska, Hawaii and the District of
Columbia from our analysis.
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Accounts".

The concepts of income used are adopted from the national income

statistics so the aggregate of prefectural incomes of all 47 prefectures is
theoretically identical to Japan's national income. As was the case for the
United States, we use national price indexes to deflate each prefecture's
income.
The data on population are prepared by the Statistics Bureau at the
Management and Coordination Agency. The principal source of these data is
the quinqueannial Population Censuses taken by the Statistics Bureau.

Data

for intercensal years are computed by interpolation and use data on vital
statistics and interprefectural migration.

The estimates correspond to the

stock of population as of October 1st each year.
Ve have GDP data for regions in seven European countries (Germany, United
Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark), totaling 73
regions.

Data for 1950, 1960, and 1970 are taken from Villem Molle.

Data

for 1966 (excluding France and Denmark), 1970 (excluding Denmark), 1974,
1980, and 1985 are from Eurostat.

The nominal figures for GDP are expressed

using current exchange rates in terms of a common currency unit.

For the

later years, the population data were collected by the Eurostat.
Ve have expanded the European data set to include the 17 regions
(Comunidades Autonomas) of Spain.

Ve had Spanish data on personal income and

gross domestic product by province for the 50 provinces. The data were then
aggregated up to the level of comunidades, using the latest definition (the
regional distribution of provinces changed sometime during the 1970s).
Starting in 1955, the data were collected (almost) biannually by the Banco de
Bilbao and published in the "Spanish National Income and its Provincial
Distribution" (Renta Nacional Espanola y su Distribucion Provincial).
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Provincial population data are taken from the Spanish Statistical
Abstract (Anuario Estadistico de Espana), published by the Instituto Nacional
de Estadistica.
This enormous data set was further expanded to include provincial
personal income data for 10 Canadian provinces for the period 1961-1990. The
data were provided to us by Coulombe and Lee [1993].

The main source of data

for Canada is Cansim, which reports annual personal income, as well as
population for the 10 provinces. The provincial personal income data are
supposed to aggregate to the national total.
Canada collects price data by provinces.

Unlike the other countries,

Hence, provincial rather than

national prices were used in this case.

(3) International Evidence on Regional Convergence.

Ve now use the regional data for the various countries to analyze
regional convergence in incomes per capita. Ve can estimate the speed of
convergence P by regressing the average growth rate of a set of regions
between times t 0 and t 0+T on the initial level of income. In order to
estimate the speed of convergence precisely we estimate the nonlinear
equation
/y.1 t) = a - [(1-e-P1)/T]•log(y.1 t) + u.t
t T'
1
O+T
' 0
' 0
0' o+
where uit t +T represents the average of the error terms, uit' between times
0' 0
t 0 and t 0+T.
(5)

(1/T)log(y.t
1

Table 1 shows non-linear least-squares in the form (5) for 48 U.S. states
for the period 1880 to 1990.4 Each cell contains four numbers.
4Equation (5) could be estimated using OLS as

The first
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p.

Underneath in parenthesis, we report P's standard
error. To its right we report the adjusted R2 of the regression and below
the R2 , the standard error of the regression (all equations have been
is the estimate of

estimated with constant terms, which are not reported in Table 1).
The first column reports the estimate of P for a single long sample
{1880-1990). The point estimate is 0.0174 (s.e.=0.0026). 5 The large value
of R2 can be also appreciated by-looking at Figure 1, which is a scatter plot
of the average growth rate of income per capita between 1880 and 1990 versus
the log of income per capita in 1880.
The second column reports the breakdown of the overall period into sets
of 10 year pieces {20 years for 1880 to 1900 and 1900 to 1920). Ve restrict
the estimate of P over time, but we allow for time fixed effects.

{1/T)log(y.t
1

·

/y 1. t) = a - (1-b1)-log(y.1 t)
' 0
' 0

O+T

+

Ve also

u.t
t
.
1
0' 0+1

The speed of convergence P could then be computed by using the equality
(1- b1 ) = [(1- e-PT) /T]. Note that OLS estimate (1- b1 ) would be inversely
related to T (the length of the period over which we compute the growth rate).
The intuition is that, if there is convergence, then the growth rate should
fall over time (because when the economy is richer, the growth rate is
smaller). Vb.en we average long periods of time, we combine early periods with
large growth rate with later periods with small growth rates. Hence, the
growth rate predicted by the original (low) level of income is smaller the
longer the time period of analysis. Note that as T goes to infinity the term
1-b1 goes to zero, and as T goes to zero, the term 1-b1 goes top.
The reason for choosing to estimate equation (5) using non-linear least
squares (NLS) rather than OLS is that the estimated speed of convergence p can
be directly compared across samples with different length without having to
use transformations. The NLS method is fine unless the autoregressive ·
coefficient, bT' is negative. Ve never found a sample period in any region of
any country where the autoregressive coefficient was close to being negative.
Hence, we conclude that the estimation of (5) using NLS is correct.
5 This regression includes 47 states or territories.
Data for the
Oklahoma territory was unavailable for 1880.
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hold constant the shares of income originated in agriculture and industry to
proxy for sectoral shocks that affect growth in the short run.

These

variables prove not to affect the estimates of P over the long run.

The

restricted point estimate of Pis 0.022 (s.e.=0.002).
Figure 2 shows the cross-sectional standard deviation for the log of per
capita personal income net of transfers for 48 U.S. states·from 1880 to 1992.
Ve observe that the dispersion declined from 0.54 in 1880 to 0.33 in 1920,
but then rose to 0.40 in 1930. This rise reflects the adverse shock to
agriculture during the 1920s:

the agricultural states were relatively poor

in 1920 and suffered a further reduction in income due to the fall in
agricultural prices.

After the 1920s shock, dispersion fell to 0.35 in 1940,

0.24 in 1950, 0.21 in 1960, 0.17 in 1970, and a low point of 0.14 in 1976:
The long-run decline stopped in the mid-1970s, after the oil shock, and ut
rose to 0.15 in 1980 and 0.19 in 1988.

The rise in income dispersion was

reversed in the last two years of the 1980s and it kept falling through 1992.
An interesting aspect of Figure 2 is that the behavior of the cross-sectional

dispersion of personal income net of transfers is very similar to that gross
of transfers.

In particular, the dispersion of both measures of income fell

after 1930, rose between 1977 and 1988 and fell between 1988 and 1992.

This

is true, even though the level,of the dispersion is lower for income gross of
transfers.

Hence, it seems as if transfers help reduce cross-state

dispersion of per capita income.

However, interstate transfers are not

responsible for the long run decline in income dispersion.
The second row of Table 1 reports similar estimates for 47 Japanese
prefectures for the period 1955-1987. The first column corresponds to a
single regression for the period 1955-1987.

The estimated P coefficient is
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0.019 (s.e.=0.004) with an adjusted R2 of 0.59. The standard error of the
regression is 0.0027. The estimates reported in Table 1 use data starting in
1955 because income data by sector are not available before that date.
Income data, however, are available from 1930.

If we use the 1930 data, the

estimated speed of convergence would be 0.027 (s.e.=0.003). The good fit can
also be appreciated in Figure 3. The evidently strong negative correlation
between the growth rate 1930-1987 and the log of per capita income in 1930
confirms the existence of P-convergence across the Japanese prefectures.
To assess the extent to which there has been u-convergence across
prefectures in Japan, we calculate the unweighted cross-sectional standard
deviation for the log of per capita income, ut' for the 47 prefectures from
1930 to 1990. Figure 4 shows that the dispersion of personal income
increased from 0.47 in 1930 to 0.63 in 1940.

One explanation of this

phenomenon is the explosion of military spending during the period.

The

average growth rates for Districts 1 (Hokkaido-Tohoku) and 7 (Kyushu), which
are mainly agricultural, were -2.4 percent and -1.7 percent per year
respectively.

On the other hand, the industrial regions of Tokyo, Osaka and

Aichi grew at +3.7, +3.1, and +1.7 percent per year respectively.
The cross prefectural dispersion has decreased dramatically since 1940:
it fell to 0.29 by 1950, to 0.25 in 1960, to 0.23 in 1970 and hit a minimum
of 0.125 in 1978.

It has increased slightly since then:

ut rose to 0.13 in

1980, 0.14 in 1985 and 0.15 in 1987. Income dispersion has been relatively
constant since then.
One popular explanation of the increase in dispersion for the 1980s is
the take-off of the Tokyo region from the rest of Japan.

Tokyo was

relatively richer at the end of the 1970s (average per capita income in real
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terms for Tokyo region was 2.000 billion yen and the average for the rest of
Japan was 1.751 billion yen).

Not only did they enjoy initial wealth, but

they also experienced faster growth during the 1980s (2.95 percent a year
versus 2.16 percent per year). This sequence of events could explain this
apparent divergence. To check this point, Barro and Sala-i-lartin [1992b]
calculated the cross sectional standard deviation of the log of per capita
income for the seven Japanese Districts, and for the six Districts exclusive
of Kanto-Koshin (which includes Tokyo). The exclusion of the Tokyo region
shifts the cross sectional variance down for all periods, but it does not
change the general behavior of gt over time.

The increase in dispersion

during the 1980s is larger if the Tokyo region is included, but it is still
increasing if excluded. Thus, even though Tokyo contributed to the general
increase in dispersion during the 1980s, its take off does not fully explain
this divergence.
Rows 3 through 8 in Table 1 refer to P-convergence across European
regions within eight countries (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy,
the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Spain).

The first row relates to the

estimate of P for a sample of 40 years, 1950-1990, when we restrict the
speeds of convergence to coincide across the 90 regions and over time.

The

estimate, however, allows for country fixed effects. The estimated speed of
convergence is 0.015 (s.e.=0.002).

The estimate of P when we allow each of

the four decades to have a fixed time effect is 0.031 (s.e.=0.004).
Figure 5 shows the relation of the growth rate of per capita GDP (income
per capita for Spain) for the 90 regions from 1950 to 1990 (1955 to 1987 for
Spain.) The values shown are all measured relative to the means of the
respective countries. The figure shows the type of negative relation that is
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familiar from the U.S. states and Japanese prefectures. The correlation
between the growth rate and the log of initial per capita GDP in Figure 5 is
-0.72.

Because the underlying numbers are expressed relative to own-country

means, the relation in Figure 5 pertains to P-convergence within countries
rather than between countries and corresponds to the estimates reported in
column 1 of Table 3.
The estimates for the long sample for each of. the five major countries
(Germany, UK, France, Italy and Spain) are reported in the next five rows.
The estimates range from 0.010 (s.e.=0.003) for Italy to 0.030 (s.e.=0.007)
for the UK.

The restricted panel estimates for the individual countries are

reported in Column 2.

Note that the individual point estimates are all close

to 0.020 or two percent per year. They range from 0.0148 for France to
0.0292 for the United Kingdom.

The estimates for Spain are 0.023

(s.e.=0.007) for the long sample and 0.019 (s.e.=0.004) for the restricted
panel estimates with fixed time effects.
The final row reports the results for Canada as given by Coulombe and Lee
(1993] for the period 1961 to 1991. The estimate of P for the 30 year sample
is 0.024 (s.e.=0.008).
Figure 6 shows the behavior of qt for the regions within the largest five
countries in the sample:

Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and

Spain. The countries are always ranked highest to lowest, as Italy, Spain,
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.

The overall pattern shows declines

in qt over time for each country, although little net change has occurred
since 1970 for Germany and the United Kingdom.

In particular, the rise in qt

from 1974 to 1980 for the United Kingdom -the only oil producer in the
European sample- likely reflects the effects of oil shocks.

In 1990, the

17

values of ut are 0.27 for Italy, 0.22 for Spain (this value corresponds to
1987), 0.186 for Germany, 0.139 for France, and 0.122 for the United Kingdom.
The main lesson from this subsection is that there is convergence both in
the p and

u

sense across regions of the U.S., Japan, Europe, Spain, and

Canada. The speeds of p convergence are extraordinarily similar across
countries:

about two percent per year.

(4) Alternative Explanations of these Results.

{i} Econometric-Theory-Based Explanations
6easurement Error and Price Disparities.

As is well know, the measurement error in the initial level of income
leads to a negative bias in the least-squares estimation of the convergence
coefficient.

The regressions show in Table 1, therefore, can exaggerate the

estimated convergence coefficient

P,

if real income is measured with error.

Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992a] argue that classical measurement error is
an unlikely explanation of the observed phenomenon. They regress the growth
rate of income on the lagged level of income and find that the estimated
coefficients are very similar to the ones displayed in Table 1.

If temporary

measurement error was important, the finding would have been a much smaller
convergence coefficient when the lagged income was used.
Aside from the usual problems of measurement of income, one reason to
expect errors is that we divide all nominal variables in each year by a
common price index.

The finding of interregional convergence in levels of

output could be explained by interregional convergence in price levels with
no real convergence.
available:

Two of the data sets used here have regional prices

Japan and Canada.

Shioji [1992], estimates the speeds of
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convergence for prefectures in Japan for the same subperiod reported in
Table 1. The only difference between his estimates and ours is that he
deflates prefectural income per capita by prefectural price levels. His
estimated speeds of convergence, however, are virtually identical to the ones
reported in Table 1. This suggests that mismeasurement of the price level is
not responsible for the observed pattern of interregional convergence in
Japan.

Coulombe and Lee [1993] report convergence coefficients for Canadian

provinces using provincial price deflators and they find similar speeds of
convergence.

Again, price convergence does not seem to be the explanation

behind our Canadian convergence.
Finally, we should point out that measurement error can bias the
regression coefficients to make it appear as if there was convergence when
there is none.

However, our analysis of u-convergence is immune to the

measurement error problem since measurement error cannot bias the measures of·
dispersion. 6 Since we tend to find that u-convergence is associated with
P-convergence in all samples, we find the measurement error argument
unconvincing.
Thus, we are fairly confident -that measurement error and interregional
price dispersion cannot explain behind candidates to explain the convergence
findings reported in Table 1 and Figures 1 to 6.

&ln order to argue that our findings about u-convergence are also
generated by measurement error, one would have to argue that the variance of
the error falls over time.

19

Danny Quah and the Unit loot Hypothesis in Short Samples.
Quah [1994, this issue] suggests that the constant speed of convergence
across data sets could be a manifestation of the vell know small sample
downward bias in unit root processes.

Quah generates a number of Monte Carlo

simulations of cross-sectionally independent random walks and runs
cross-sectional regressions like the ones we run in Table 1. He shows that
speeds of convergence of 2 percent per year can be estimated fairly
consistently when the cross-sectional sample size is close to the sample size
used in this paper (the length of time he needs to get speeds of 2 percent
per year, however, are a bit larger than the ones we use in this paper).
Quah's conclusion is that the constant estimates of 2 percent per year
could just be a statistical illusion since a collection of random walks
estimated in a cross section could deliver such an outcome.
says that this is unlikely.

However, he also

His reasoning is that the standard errors

associated with his estimates are very large.

In fact, a zero speed of

convergence (the true speed) can almost never be rejected in his Monte Carlo
simulations.

This is never the case in the estimates of Table 1.

One big problem with Quah's analysis is that his collection of
independent random walks predicts that the cross-sectional dispersion of
income should be increasing over time.

Ve showed in Figures 2, 4, and 6 that

this is not the case for virtually any of the countries in our samples.
other words, if the incomes in the real world have been generated by
independent random walks like the ones proposed by Quah, then where did
Figures 2, 4 and 6 come from?7

7This terminology was first introduced by Sala-i-Martin [1990].

In
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(ii) National Government Policies.
An intriguing possible explanation for the convergence results is that

the government of the country whose regions are being studied purposefully
redistributes income across regions in such a way that convergence appears. to
occur at a speed of about two percent per year.
Although not fully studied in all data sets, we can access this
possibility as follows.

First, in the United States (where the data are

available) the pattern of convergence, both in the P and the u sense, seems
to be exactly the same for income net of transfers and income gross of
transfers.

Furthermore, the pattern of convergence seems to exist in income

per capita as well as Gross Domestic Product.
is GDP.

The data for European regions

This measure of output refers to production before transfers.

Taken

together, this evidence suggests an empirically minor role of public

transfers.
But the government could induce convergence by spending, hiring and
investing in the relatively poor regions financed by taxes from the
relatively rich regions.

If this were true, however, convergence should

vanish from our regional data sets once such measures of public spending are
held constant.

Sala-i-Martin (1990] adds measures of federal spending,

investment and employment in a cross-state growth regression for the United
States and finds little change in the convergence coefficients.

In fact, in

the United States, there seems to be no relation between the level of income
of a region and the amount of spending or employment by the Federal
.government in that region.
Finally, we can argue that the effect of the government in the process of
convergence is minor by observing that the speeds of convergence are
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surprisingly similar across data sets.

Since the degree to which national

governments use regional cohesion policies is very different, the fact that
the speeds of convergence are very similar across countries suggests that
public policy plays a very small role in the overall process of regional
convergence.

{iii}

Growth lodels: Neoclassical versus Endogenous Growth.

The standard neoclassical growth model is now the conventional way of
explaining convergence results found in the previous subsection.

Consider

the constant saving rate version of the model due to Solow [1956] and Swan
[1956].

Lets be the constant saving rate, where O<s<l.

In a closed

economy, savings are equal to gross investment, and gross investment, in
turn, is equal to the net increase in the capital stock plus depreciation.
Vritten in per capita terms, the increase in the capital stock is given by

.

(6)

k

=

s•Af(k) - (6+n)k,

where k is the capital stock per person, Af(k) is the production function in
per capita terms, 6 is the depreciation rate and n is the exogenous rate of
population growth.

The parameter A reflects the level of technology, where

technology is considered in a macroeconomic sense that includes aggregate
distortions such as taxation, imperfect property rights, and other things of
this nature.
constants.

Ve assume for the moment that A, 6, and n are exogenous
Equation (6) is the fundamental differential equation of the

Solow-Swan model which, given k0 , describes the dynamic behavior of capital
at all future times. If we divide both sides of (6) by k, we get an
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expression for the growth rate of the capital stock, k:

7k = s•Af(k)/k -

(7)

(6+n).

Given k0 , the behavior of the economy can be analyzed using Figure 7. The
figure displays two functions: a horizontal line at 6+n which we will call
the depreciation curve and a downward-sloping line, s•Af(k)/k, which we will
call the savings curve.

Equation (7) indicates that ·the growth rate is the

difference between the two. The neoclassical assumption of diminishing
returns to capital ensures that the savings curve is downward sloping.

The

Inada conditions (which are also standard assumptions in the neoclassical
model) ensure that the savings curve is vertical at k=O and it approaches the
horizontal axis ask tends to infinity.

Since the savings curve takes all

values between zero and infinity, we are sure that it crosses the
depreciation line at least once (that is, an intersection exists).

Since it

is always downward sloping, we are sure that it crosses it only once (that
is, the intersection is unique).

Thus, the crossing point is called the

steady-state capital stock.

The important point for the purpose of our discussion is that the saving
curve is downward sloping.

If we think that all economies within one of our

data sets (say all the states of the U.S.) have a similar technology in the
sense of having similar parameters A and

o,

as well as similar saving rates,

s, and rates of population growth, n, then they will all converge to a single
steady state.

Figure 7 shows that, in this case, the growth rate

corresponding to the poor economy (whose capital stock is called kpoor) is
larger than the growth rate of the rich one (krich).

Hence, if the only

difference across economies is the initial capital stock, the neoclassical
model predicts convergence in the sense that poor regions will grow faster

23

than rich ones.s
The intuition behind the convergence implication of the neoclassical
model is that, because of diminishing returns to capital, each addition to
the capital stock generates enormous additions to output when the capital
stock is small. The opposite is true when the capital stock is large.

1he One-Sector lodel of Endogenous Growth.
The convergence prediction of the neoclassical model conflicts with the
prediction of the one-sector models of endogenous growth.
example, the simplest of such models, the AK model.
violates two key neoclassical assumptions:
and the Inada conditions.

Consider, for

The linear AK technology

diminishing returns to capital

If we substitute the neoclassical technology Af(k)

by the linear technology Ak, then the growth equation (7) becomes
(8)

The dynamic behavior of this model is depicted in Figure 8.
curve is still a horizontal line at 6+n.

The depreciation

The savings curve is no longer

downward sloping but, rather, it is a horizontal-line at s•A.

Figure 8 is

draw under the assumption that sA>6+n, which implies a positive and constant
distance between the saving and depreciation line and, as a result, a
positive and constant growth rate.
Consider now two economies which differ only in the initial capital
stocks (krich and kpoor in Figure 8). The model predicts that the growth

srf there are regional differences in saving rates, technologies or rates
of population growth, then the model predicts conditional convergence in that
the steady-state of each economy needs to be held constant empiricallr (see
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991,1992a) and Mankiw, Romer and Veil (1992).) See
also the discussion in Section One.
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rate of the two economies is the same so they will not converge.9
The fact that the neoclassical model predicts convergence and the AK
model does not, explains why the convergence hypothesis has received so much
attention in the last few years:

it is one simple way to test the two

models.10

Open Economy Considerations: Interregional Credit larkets.
One the main critiques of the neoclassical interpretation of the
convergence phenomenon is that the economies in the sample are not obviously
closed in that they all have access to the same capital market.

The

neoclassical model with perfect capital mobility, however, predicts
instantaneous convergence to the steady state, which is in clear
contradiction with the estimated speed of 2 percent per year.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that the setup with perfect
9 If we allow for cross-regional differences in A, s, 6 or n, then the
growth rates will not be the same across economies. However, there will not
be a systematic negative relation between growth and the initial level of
income unless the A ors (6 or n) are systematically higher (lower) for poor
regions. There is no a priori reason why this would be the case. Hence, the
model still does not predict convergence.
10 Strictly speaking, the convergence hypothesis is not a test of
endogenous growth, but instead, a test of the absence of diminishing returns.
ACES technology with high elasticity of substitution, for example, may
generate positive steady-state rates of growth and convergence. The reason
is that the key to endogenous growth is the violation of the Inada condition,
while the key to convergence is the existence of diminishing returns to
capital. The CES production mentioned above displays diminishing returns to
capital (so it predicts convergence), but violates the Inada conditions so it
generates endogenous growth. See also the production functions proposed by
Kurz [1968] and Jones and Manuelli [1990].
Furthermore, Mulligan and Sala-1-Martin [1993] show that two-sector
models of endogenous growth like those of Uzawa [1965] and Lucas [1988]
predict convergence regressions like the ones we estimate in this paper. To
test the neoclassical model from these models, a good measure of human
capital is needed. Although there have been attempts to compute measures of
human capital, a satisfactory estimate is not yet available.
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capital mobility is just as unrealistic as the setup with no capital mobility
at all:

even though the economies under consideration have access to

national and international capital markets, it does not follow that they can
borrow unlimited amounts of resources.

In particular, in order to borrow

they need collateral and maybe not all the capital stock in the economy can
be used as such (for example, in the absence of slave markets, it may be hard
to use human capital as collateral.) Barro, lankiw and Sala-i-Martin [1995]
propose a model of partial capital mobility where only a fraction of the
capital stock can be used as collateral. Their main conclusion is that the
speed of convergence predicted for a closed economy (with no capital
mobility), is very similar to the speed predicted by an open economy model
where the share of mobile capital that can be used as collateral is about one
half.

For all practical purposes, therefore, the assumption of a closed

economy does not yield terribly misleading results, as long as one is ready
to believe that mobility exists but is not quite perfect. Thus, the
neoclassical model with partial capital mobility is consistent with the
empirical evidence on convergence.
Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin [1995] also show that the one sector
model of endogenous growth cannot predict convergence whether there is
perfect, partial, or no capital mobility at all.

{iv}

Can an Extended Jl Xodel Explain Convergence?

The neoclassical model is clearly a good candidate to account for the
convergence results.

Ve can now ask whether we can amend the AK model so

that it too predicts convergence.
Ve start by looking at Figure 8, which says that, if A, s, 6 and n are
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constant, then the growth rate is independent of the capital stock. Ve can
think of the neoclassical model as a way to relax the assumption that the
average product of capital (which in Figure 8 is given by A) is.a constant:
diminishing returns to capital make the average product of capital a
decreasing function of k. The savings curve becomes dowward sloping so the
savings and depreciation curves become closer ask increases (as depicted in
Figure 7), and this is what makes the. model predict convergence.
Along similar lines, we could generate convergence in the AK model if we
could argue that the saving rates was a decreasing function of k (so that
the savings curve in Figure 8 is dowward sloping) or if the rate of
population growth, n, or the depreciation rate, D, were increasing functions
of k (so that the depreciation curve is upward sloping.) Ve analyze these
possibilities in this section.

Endogeneizing the Saving Bate.
Ve can see in Figure 8 that if we can generate a saving rate decreasing
ink, we will obtain an endogenous growth model that predicts convergence.
The setups in the literature on endogenous growth always allow representative
agents to choose their consumption and saving behavior optimally.

In other

words, the saving rate is allowed to move freely with k. The general
prediction, however, is that if the technology is linear in capital, then the
saving rate does not fall with k but, rather, it is optimally set to a
constant.

This is true, for example, for all positive intertemporal

elasticities of substitution (as long as this elasticity is kept constant).
To get the saving rate to fall along the transition, we would need to have
the rate of return falling sharply.

The problem is that the rate of return
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in an AI economy is constant.
The AK model may predict convergence in a setup with heterogeneous agents
whose discount rates increase with the level of wealth (Uzawa [1968]):

if

poor people are more patient then rich people {that is, if their discount
rate is lower), then they prefer steeper consumption profiles.

In other

words, they tend to consume relatively less and save relatively more than
rich people.

It follows that the income growth rates for the poor are higher

{that is, there will be P-convergence across families or regions.)
Notice that for this argument to work, we need to assume that rich people
are more impatient, an assumption which has been often criticized and
dismissed as implausible (one would think that rich people can afford to be
more patient).

One clever way.of explaining the positive relationship

between discount rates and wealth is provided by Mulligan [1993].

His main

point is that in order to be altruistic towards people, one has to spend time
with them to develop the required attachment.

Parents with high wages find

it more expensive to spend time with their children so they end up being less
altruistic towards them.

It follows that they discount the future more

(because the future is the time when their children, rather than themselves,

will consume).

Endogeneizing Depreciation
Another specification of the AK model that would result in convergence is
to have the depreciation curve be an increasing function of k.

One way to do

this would be to argue that the depreciation rate is an increasing function
of k.

Surprisingly, the depreciation rate remains an unexplored area of

research so theories that relate the physical rate of depreciation to the
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capital stock are unavailable.

Bndogeneizing Population Growth
Another way to get an upward sloping depreciation curve is to have the
rate of population growth be an increasing function of k.
stock of population grows for three reasons:

In general, the

increases in fertility,

reductions in mortality, and migration. The relation between mortality and
growth remains an unexplored research area; There has been a recent interest
in the relation between fertility and growth (see for instance Becker and
Barro [1988] and Barro and Becker [1989].)

However, it is easy to see that

endogenous fertility rates cannot be the explanation behind the existence of
convergence within the AK model:

in order to explain convergence, fertility

(and population growth) should rise with the stock of capital.
however, the exact opposite is true:
rates.

Empirically,

rich countries have lower fertility

This leaves migration as the only potential explanation of the

potential positive relation between the rate of population growth and the
stock of capital.
Like the mobility of physical capital, mobility of persons could
potentially be the explanation behind the findings on interregional
convergence.

Both capital and labor move to those economies which deliver

the highest return for their services. This implies that capital moves from
rich regions to poor regions whereas labor moves from poor economies to rich
economies.

If the capital stock is positively related to wages, it follows

that the rate of population growth will be positively related to the capital
stock (see Dolado, Goria, and !chino [1993].)

Unfortunately, in the AK model

the wage rate is not positively related to the capital stock so that the
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relation between the rate of population growth and the capital stock
disappears. Hence, the AK model does not predict convergence, even when we
allow for migration (See Barro and Sala-i-lartin [1995, Chapter 9].)
At the empirical level, Barro and Sala-i-lartin (1991, 1992b, 1995] show
that the sensitivity of migration to initial income is small and about 0.0025
for the United States, Japan and Europe (Germany, France, U.K., Italy, and
Spain).

In other words, a ten percent income differential triggers a

migration rate that changes the rate of population growth by 0.25 percent.
Taking this into account, they show that the convergence coefficients are
virtually unchanged once one allows for interregional migration to occur.
Hence, from an empirical point of view, migration does not seem to be the
answer either.

(v) Technological Diffusion
Another way to generate convergence is to allow for the level of
technology of the poor economies to catch up with that of the rich.

In 1962,

Nelson and Phelps postulated that the rate of technological progress for a
country was a function of the distance between its level of technology and
the level of technology of the world leader.

.

(9)

A./A.
1
1

=

i-(A1eader

In other words,
-

A.),
1

where Ai is the level of technology of region i, and Aleader is the level of
technology of the world leader.

If we embed this assumption in an otherwise

AK model, we can easily generate convergence in the levels of per capita
income (capital may not converge but the parameter A does).
Ve can incorporate this idea in the modern models of endogenous growth
_and R&D explored by Romer [1990] and Grossman and Helpman [1991].

These
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models assume that technological progress takes the form of new types of
capital goods, and generates endogenous growth because there are no
diminishing returns to the number of goods.

The new goods are introduced by

firms who purposefully perform research and development to invent the goods
j

in exchange for a permanent patent that allows them to collect monopoly
profits on the sales of such goods.

They show that, other things being

equal, the growth rate is a negative function of the cost of inventing new

products (the cost of MD).
One can amend these models to allow for technological diffusion (see
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Chapter 8). For example, we can think of
lagging countries as being able to imitate the products invented in the
leading nations.

The process of imitation would be similar to the process of

R&D in that a fraction of resources would have to be spent to learn how to
imitate the product.

The growth rate for these imitating countries would be

a function of the imitation costs.

To the extent that imitation costs are

lower than innovation costs, the lagging countries would tend to grow faster
so the economies would converge.
The question is what happens when the poor imitating countries (which
grow faster than the rich, innovating countries) completely catch up so that
there are no more goods to be imitated (one can argue that this situation
applies to Japan today.)

Presumably, they will have to become innovators

themselves and they will have to pay the higher cost of innovation, which
will reduce their growth rate.
Ve could also think that the cost of imitation is a negative function of
the goods that remain to be imitated (the cost of imitation converging to the
innovation cost as the number of goods that remain to be copied goes to
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zero). The idea is that there are some goods that are easy to copy and
others that are not.

If countries can choose from a large pool of goods,

they will start copying the ones that are easy and cheaper to imitate. As
they exhaust the easy goods, they will have to switch towards goods that are
harder to copy. The growth rate of productivity would fall as the
productivity differential (reflected in the pool of goods that remain to be
copied) disappears.

Note that this model would provide a micro-foundation

to the Nelson and Phelps conjecture about the form of technological
convergence.

(5)

Conclusions

This paper reviewed and extended the empirical evidence on regional
convergence.

Ve argued that both u and P-convergence seem to occur in a

variety of data sets.

The speeds at which the regions of different countries

converge over different time periods are surprisingly similar:
percent per year.
significant.

about two

This estimate is very robust and always strongly

If we think of its economic meaning, however, we note that a

speed of two percent per year is quite slow.

It implies, for example, that

50 percent of the distance between an economy's initial level of income and
its steady state disappears in about 35 years, and that 75 percent of this
difference vanishes only after 70 years.

Put another way, one fourth of the

original income differences are predicted to remain after a long period of 70
years.
A variety of explanations that could account for these findings were

explored.

Some of them were rejected:

we argued that statistical artifacts

such as measurement error and small sample bias in integrated processes were
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unlikely explanations. Regional price dispersion and national public
policies that attempted to induce convergence vere not likely to be the
underlying forces behind the observed patterns of convergence either. Ye
also argued that the one-sector models of endogenous growth could not explain
these findings, even if ve amended them to include capital mobility,
endogenous fertility, or migration.

Endogeneizing the saving rate vas a

potential solution in a vorld of heterogeneous agents, but only if rich
individuals vere less patient than poor ones (an assumption that is often
seen as implausible.)
Among the still plausible explanations, the neoclassical model without or
with partial capital mobility is the most popular one.

The slow speeds of

convergence estimated in the different data sets, however, suggest that the
parameterizations of the neoclassical model normally used by economists are
inconsistent with the evidence because they tend to generate much higher
predictions for the speed of convergence.

For example, the neoclassical

model with a capital share of 0.3 tends to predict speeds of convergence of
about 6 or 7 percent per year.

In order order to make the model consistent

with the magnitudes estimated, the capital share needs to be close to 0.7 or

0.8 (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992a].) This can be achieved by thinking
of capital in a broad sense that includes human capital elements.
Another set of theories consistent with the evidence on regional economic
convergence are models of endogenous growth with technological diffusion.
According to these theories, the slow speed of two percent per year suggests
that technology does not instantaneously flow across countries.

The

theoretical reason for such a low speed of technical adaptation may be the
existence of imitation and implementation costs.

These costs may be
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negatively related to the amount of technology vhich remains to be imitated.
The evidence discussed in this paper cannot distinguish the neoclassical
hypothesis diminishing returns to capital from the hypothesis of positive
(but slov) rates of technological diffusion. Further research is therefore
needed in order to find out vhich one of the tvo hypothesis is more likely to
dominate the process of regional economic cohesion.
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Table 1
Countries

Long-Run
Single Regression

Panel
Estimates

(s.e.)

R2
(s.e. Reg.)

0.017
(0.002)

0.89
[.0015]

0.022
(0.002)

Japan
47 Prefectures
(1955-1990)

0.019
(0.004)

0.59
[.0027]

0.031
(0.004)

Europe Total
90 regions
(1950-1990)

0.015
(0.002)

- .- - .- -

0.018
(0.003)

Germany
(11 regions)

0.014
(0.005)

0.55
[0.0027]

0.016
(0.006)

UK

(11 regions)

0.030
(0.007)

0.61
[0.0021]

0.029
(0.009)

France
(21 regions)

0.016
(0.004)

0.55
[0.0022]

0.015
(0.003)

Italy
(20 regions)

0.010
(0.003)

0.46
[0.0031]

0.016
(0.003)

Spain
(17 regions)
(1955-87)

0.023
(0. 007)

0.63
[0.004]

0.019
(0.005)

0.024
(0.008)

0.29
[0.0025]

p
United States
48 States
(1880-1990)

Canada
10 Provinces
(1961-91)

p
(s.e.)

-

...

.

.- -

Notes to Table 1: The regressions use non linear squares to estimate
equations of the form:

where Yi,t-T is the per capita income in region i at the beginning of the
interval divided by the overall CPI. Tis the length of the interval; "other
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variables" are regional dummies and sectoral variables that hold constant
temporary shocks that may affect the performance of a region in a manner that
is correlated with the initial level of income (recall that when the error
term is correlated with the explanatory variable, then the 0LS estimate of p
is biased).
Each column contains four numbers. The first one is the estimate of p.
Underneath it, in parentheses, its standard error. To its right, the adjusted
R2 of the regression and below the R2 , the standard error of the equation.
Thus, constant, regional dummies and/or structural variables are not reported
in the Table.
·
The coefficients for Europe Total include one dummy for each of the eight
countries.
Column 1 reports the panel estimates when all the subperiods are assumed to
have the same coefficient p. This estimation allows for time effects. For
most countries, the restriction of P being constant over the subperiods cannot
be rejected (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin L1995].)
Colwnn 2 reports the value of P estimated from a single cross section using
the longest available data. For example, for the United States, the
coefficient P estimated by regressing the average growth rate between 1880 and
1990 is P=0.022 (s.e.=0.0002).
·
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Figure 1: Convergence of Personal Income across U.S. States.
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Figure 2:
Dispersion of Personal Income across U.S. States, 1880-1992
0.6 ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,

Without Transfers

0.5

C

/

0.4

.Q
~

Q)

C.

(/)

i:S

0.3

0)

E

8C

Without Transfers
0.2

With Transfers (since 1929) ~

0.1

O 1" , " " "
1880

,i::,.

1, "

1890

• ,

1 , 1,

11

, , , • , 1 "

1900

1 11

"

1910

• ,. "

1 •• ,,

1920

1 , , 1I

1• "

1930

, , , , , , 1"

11 , "

1940

, ,

1"

, , "

1950

, "

1 11

, 11 • "

1960

,

1, "

1970

•"

1 1,

11

, , , "

1980

, "

1 .1

1990

0

Figure 3:
Convergence of Personal Income Across Japanese Prefectures
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Figure 5: Growth Rate from 1950 to 1990
versus 1950 per capita GDP for 90 Regions in Europe
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Figure 7: The Neoclassical Model of Solow and Swan
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Figure 8: The One Sector Model of Endogenous Growth.
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